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THE USE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS
TO DISCOURAGE ABORTION:
WHO WILL PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR?
Claudia J.Postell*
INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress enacted the Family Planning Services and Population
Research Act. Presently, more than 4,000 clinics receive an estimated $200
million annually in Title X funds for family planning services.2 Its targeted
population includes more than 9.5 million women between the ages of 20-44
with incomes below 150 percent of poverty.'
In 1988, under a directive of then-President Reagan, new regulations to Title
X were promulgated." The regulations sought to set specific compliance
standards with the statutory language in the 1970 Act, which provided that
"none of the funds appropriated under this title shall be used in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning." s In addition; the regulations
require recipients to refer clients diagnosed as pregnant for appropriate prenatal
care or social services assistance by providing a list of providers that promote
the welfare of both the mother and unborn child; prohibit recipients from
directly encouraging or promoting abortion, such as including on the referral
list health-care providers whose principal business is abortion services and
excluding those providers who do not perform abortions;" and require Title X
projects to be physically and financially separate from facilities offering
abortion activities.8

Member of the class of 1992, District of Columbia School of Law.
1. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970 § 1008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a.300-6

(1990) [hereinafter Title X].
2. New York Law Journal, May 24, 1991, at 1, col 3.
3. Note, The Thde X Family PlanningGag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up ConsfrudonalRights?
41 Stan. L Rev. 401, 408 (1989) [hereirafter Gag Rule].

4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-300-6 (1990).
5. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, supra note 1.
6. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1990). (In cases of an emergency, the Title X project must only refer the
chent to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services.)
7. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(3) (1990).

8. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1990).
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On May 23, 1991, the Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan9 upheld a
challenge to the new regulations by holding that workers at Title X clinics
cannot counsel their clients on abortion.
The Rust decision, however, has raised much concern. First, critics claim that
the regulations depart significantly from prior administrative policies. Under
past direction of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), those
working in Title X programs counseled and referred women for abortions if
they requested such information or if it were medically necessary.10 Also, an
organization receiving Title X funds could operate an abortion clinic if it kept
separate accounts for both clinics to show that it was not using Title X funds
for abortion services."1
Second, critics claim that the regulations restrict the free-speech rights of
doctors and patients. 2 On November 6, 1991, a congressional majority of
Democrats and a few Republicans approved a 1992 HHS appropriation that
would have reopened Title X funds for abortion services. On November 19,
1991, President Bush vetoed the measure, which was sustained by the House
by a 276 to13 186 vote, 12 short of the two-thirds majority needed to nullify the
Rust ban.
Initially, the regulations required the counselor at the Title X clinic to tell a
pregnant woman requesting informatio: on abortion that "the project does not
consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does

9. 111 S.CL 1759 (1991).
10. In a series of memoranda and opinions from 1970 to 1988, the HHS had consistently interpreted
the statute to prohibit Title X recipients from conducting activities that directly encouraged abortion, but
allowed the clinics to provide such information concerning abortion services.
In 1981, the HHS issued departmental guidelines that mandated nondirective counseling on any options

for pregnant women, including abortion, if a client requested such information.
11. Until the new regulations were promulgated, the HHS position was that as long as the funds were

kept separate, physical separation was not necessary. In 1971, the Office of General Counsel of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare indicated in an opinion letter that under most circumstances,
a hospital that provided abortions for family planning services could receive Title X for operation as a
separate family planning clinic if the funds were kept separate. (Memorandum from Joel Mangel, Office of
General Counsel, HEW, to Louis M. Hellman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs (Apr. 20,
1971)).

12. In Perry v. Sindenmam, 408 U.S. 593,597 (1972), the Court held that participation in a governmentfunded program cannot be conditioned on the waiver of a person's constitutional rights, especially if those
rights are related to free'speech. The Court maintained that 'if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech ... his exercise of those freedoms would in effect

be penalized and inhibited.'
13. The Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
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not counsel or refer for abortion." 4 On March 20, 1992, this regulation was
amended by the Bush Administration to allow doctors to tell pregnant women
that abortion is an option. It, still, however, prohibits nurses and counselors
from giving such advice.' 5 On March 30, 1992, 23 medical organizations,
including the American Medical Association, issued a letter to all members of
Congress urging that the amendment does not go far enough.16 The groups
contend that the 1988 language "inhibits the ability of the medical and nursing
professions to communicate with their patients fully." They further contend that
the revision still "censors the speech of physicians and nurses. " "'
Third, critics claim that the Rust decision raises constitutional issues
surrounding a woman's access to abortion. In Roe v. Wade"8 the Court held
that women have a fundamental right to decide whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy. Yet, in Rust, as well as a number of cases decided since Roe, the
Court has upheld various state measures aimed at preventing women from
having abortions. These cases, which will be discussed below, represent a shift
in views on abortion in which the government-through its funding-has
attempted to impose on society the views of those in power involving a
woman's fundamental right to choose. These cases make clear that although the
government cannot infringe on a woman's constitutional right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy, it does not have to fund such activity.
The government contends that its funding of those programs that "promote
life" does not take away this privacy right, since women can seek assistance
that is not federally funded. It further contends that since participation in these
programs is voluntary, the government can place conditions on recipients based
on adherence to its social policy.
These contentions, however, are unrealistic since few women who depend
on federally funded programs for all their medical needs can afford outside
assistance. As a result, the fundamental right to choose for many women, due
to their economic status, no longer exists.
This note will examine the changing views on abortion over the past two
decades in which the government has encouraged childbirth over abortion and
how this has affected poor women in asserting their constitutional right to
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

42 C.F.R. § 59.8(B)(5) (1990).
The Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1992, at 1, col. 1.
The Washington Post, Mar. 31, 1992, at AS.
M,. at col 1.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To ABORTION

In Roe v. Wade, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that made it a crime
to have an abortion unless the mother's health was at risk. In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the Court first recognized a woman's right to choose
in the concept of personal liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as in the right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights
or its penumbrae. 9 It then found that this right is broad enough to include
a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy."
Although recognizing a right to privacy, the Roe Court held that a woman's
right to choose is not absolute and must be weighed against competing state
interests. The Court refused to recognize a fetus as life from its conception.
Rather, it considered a fetus as a potential life. While a state has an interest in
protecting maternal health and potential life, the Court found that these interests
are separate and distinct and "[e]ach grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
compelling."2 1
The Roe Court established a trimester approach to balance a state's
competing interests against a woman's right to privacy. During the first
trimester, the state has no interest in maternal health and potential life, and the
decision is therefore left to the discretion of the pregnant woman and her
doctor. At the end of the first trimester, the state has an interest in the mother's
health and can regulate, but only if such regulation is reasonably related to
maternal health. Finally, during the third trimester, following viability-the
point in which the fetus can live a meaningful life outside the womb-the
state's interest in potential life becomes compelling.
The Texas statute in Roe imposed severe criminal sanctions on doctors and
other medical personnel who performed abortions during the first trimester,
thus interfering with the availability and safety of such services. In striking
down the statute, the Court found that no such state interest during the first
trimester justified such sweeping restrictions on a woman's constitutionally
protected interest. It held:

19. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
21. Id at 162-63.
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[W]e do not agree that... Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an
important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health
of the pregnant woman ... and that it has still another important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.'
Although Roe has not been overturned, the Supreme Court has upheld
several cases decided since then that prohibit abortion-related activity in
government-funded programs. The regulations at issue in these cases were
created by the government to provide medical services to the poor. For
example, in enacting Title X, one of its purposes was to expand the availability
of family planning services to all people desiring such information. Further, in
evaluating the need for Title X, Congress noted that the 'problems of excess
fertility for the poor result to a large extent from the inaccessibility of family
planning information and services. Although family planning is not a panacea
for poverty, about one-half of the poor children in our nation are in families
with five or more children."' In addition, at the time the act was enacted, of
the 5 million poor women who could use such services if available, only 1 out
of 4 found them available.24
Beal v. Doe,' involved a challenge to a state's Medicaid program, in which
the state denied funding for nontherapeutic abortions. The Supreme Court held
that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require a state to fund
nontherapeutic abortions as a condition to participating in the joint federal-state
Medicaid program, which was created to provide to needy people federally
funded medical assistance.26
Under the federal statute, participating states can assist in five general
categories.2 7 Although the statute does not require state funding of all medical

22. Id.
23. HR. Rep. No. 1472,91st Cong. 2d Sess., Reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE Co~no. AND AD.MIN. NEWS
5074.
24. Id.

25. 432.U.S. 438 (19T7).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970 ed. and Supp. V).
27. The general categories of medical treatment are: (I) inpatient hospital services (other than thc for
tuberculosis or mental illnesses); (2) outpatient hospitalservices; (3) laboratory and X-ray services; (4) skilled
nursing facilities, which include family planning services and supplies furnished to people of childbearing
age who are sexually active and eligible under the state plan and who desire such services; and (5) rervices
that are furnished by physicians, either in a office, a patient's home, a hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or
elsewhere.
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treatment that falls within these categories, it does require state Medicaid
programs to establish reasonable standards to determine whether the assistance
is consistent with the Act's objectives. 8
In Beal, the state had denied financial assistance to respondents seeking an
abortion who were eligible for medical assistance under its Medicaid plan.
Medicaid refused to pay because respondents did not have a certificate
indicating that their abortions were medically necessary. Respondents claimed
that the statutory medical-necessity requirement was contrary to provisions in
Title XIX and denied them equal protection of the laws.
In upholding the requirement, the Court reasoned that it fully complies with
the federal law's broad objective to allow states to provide medical assistance
to those whose incomes do not meet the cost of necessary medical services.
Respondents had argued that excluding nontherapeutic abortions from
coverage under Medicaid was unreasonable both economically and health-wise.
The Court, however, rejected this argument, pointing to language in Roe,
which indicated a state's "'important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life." "29
'
Although the Roe Court stated that this interest does not become compelling
enough to justify a state's interference until the end of the first trimester, the
Beal Court expanded this concept and held that "it is a significant state interest
existing throughout the course of the woman's pregnancy. " '
Further, the Beal Court, while recognizing its effect on the poor, justified its
holding by indicating, "[a]lthough serious statutory questions might be
presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from
its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State
to refuse to fund unnecessary-though perhaps desirable-medical services." 3
The Court further rationalized its holding since abortions were unlawful in most
states when Title XIX was passed and because the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, which administered the statute, had taken the stance
that the Act allowed, but did not require, abortion funding.

28. Under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program, an abortion is deemed medically necessary if
documented evidence shows that (1)continuing the pregnancy threatens the mother's health (2) an infant
may be born with debilitating physical or mental deficiencies; and (3) continuing the pregnancy as a result
of rape or incest may threaten the patient's health. In addition, two doctors must examine the patient, and
the doctors must perform the procedure in a state-accredited hospital.
29. Rea/, 432 U.S. at 445, quoting, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162.
30. Sea/, 432 U.S. at 446.
31. Id at 444-45.
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Yet, the Court's analysis fails for two reasons. First, the state's refusal to
pay for such medical services frustrates the purpose of the Medicaid
program-to help poor people to "attain or retain capability for independence
or self care."32 Second, although abortions were not legal when Medicaid was
enacted and when its family-planning amendment was adopted, nothing in the
Act suggests that it was designed to subsidize only those services that were
legally permissible when the statute and the amendment were enacted.
In this respect, the analysis of the appeals court in Beal is on point:
It is impossible to believe that in enacting Title XIX Congress intended
to freeze the medical services available to recipients at those which were
legal in 1965. Congress surely intended Medicaid to pay for drugs not
legally marketable under the FDA's regulations in 1965 which are
subsequently found to be marketable. We can see no reason why the same
analysis should not apply to the Supreme Court's legalization of elective
abortion in 1973. 33
In addition, the Beal Court failed to recognize the effect of its decision on
poor women. In response, Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]he opponents of abortion have attempted every imaginable means to
circumvent the commands of the Constitution and impose their moral
choices upon the rest of society.... The present cases involve the most
vicious attacks yet devised. The impact of the regulations heie falls
tragically upon those among us least able to help or defend themselves.
As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably will have the
practical effect of preventing nearly all poor women from obtaining safe
and legal abortions.34
In Maher v. Roe,3" decided the same day as Beal, the Court upheld a
regulation that limited state Medicaid benefits to abortions that were medically
necessary. To get an abortion in the first trimester, the doctor performing the

32. Beal, 432 U.S. 438, 452 (1977) (Brennan L, dissenting), quoting, the family-plannng amendment
to the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a)(4)(C) (1970 ed. Supp. V).
33. Doe v. BeaL 523 F.2d 611, 622-623 (3d Cir. 1975).
34. Bea/, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall. J., dissenting).
35. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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procedure had to submit a certificate indicating that the abortion was medically
necessary.
In Maher, two indigent women had sought nontherapeutic abortions but
were unable to get such certificates. 6 They claimed the state regulation was
inconsistent with requirements under Title XIX and violated their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection. The Court, in determining the
validity of the state medical-necessity requirement, noted that states are not
obligated under the Constitution to pay for any medical expenses of the poor.
Yet, when a state participates in a program designed to alleviate some of the
hardships of poverty, the way in which it dispenses the funds is subject to
constitutional scrutiny.37
In evaluating the equal protection challenge, the Court held that the lower
court had erred in holding that the regulations violated the Equal Protection
Clause, pointing to language in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,3 8
which laid the basic framework for such claims. It held:
We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the
disadvantage or some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring
strict judicial scrutiny.... If not, the [legislative] scheme must still be
examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious
discrimination.39
Although the regulation in Maher clearly impinged on a fundamental
right-to determine whether or not to terminate a pregnancy as established in
Roe-the Court found that no discrimination against a suspect class existed. It
further held that an indigent woman seeking an abortion does not come within
the category of a disadvantaged class recognized in other cases.4" Yet, the
Court acknowledged that its denial of welfare to the poor "creates a wealth

36. When this action was filed, Mary Poe, a 16-year-old high school student, had gotten an abortion at
a local hospital. She did not have the certificate, and the Department of Social Services refused to reimburse
the hospital. On the other hand, Susan Roe was an unwed mother of three who was unable to get an abortion
because her doctor refused to issue a certificate that the procedure was medically necessary. The district court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the state officials from refusing to pay for her abortion.
37. 432 U.S. at 470.
38. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. Id at 17 (emphasis added).
40. See Rodriquez. 411 U.S. at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired
goods or services." 4 It pointed out, however, that the Court has never held
that "financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis."42
The Court then upheld the requirement, emphasizing that the statutie in Roe
was clearly an example of state regulation that is not permissible. The Maher
Court contended that "[t]here is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy."43 Yet, in Singleton v. Wulff, "
decided one year earlier, the Court refused to adopt this same concept in an
abortion case. In a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan criticized the
majority's view, he notes:
MR. JUSTICE POWELL would so limit Doe and the other cases cited,
explaining them as cases in which the state "directly interfered with the
abortion decision" and "directly interdicted the normal functioning of the
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain procedures. (428
U.S. at 128] There is no support in the language of the cited cases for
this distinction.... Moreover, a 'direct interference' or 'interdiction' test
does not appear to be supported by precedent.""
The Maher Court then pointed to cases in which it invalidated restrictions
that affected a woman's right to choose. In holding that these cases
recognize a woman's protected interest as established in Roe, the Maher Court
held that while the right protects the woman from undue interference in
deciding whether to have an abortion, "[i]t implies no limitation on the

41. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471.
42. Id
43. Id at 475.
44. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
45. Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 485 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
46. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70-71 n.1 1 (1976) in which
the Court held that a state's spousal consent requirement unconstitutionally interfered with a wife's and her
doctor's decision to terminate a pregnancy; Carey v. Population Services International 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
in which the Court held that a requirement fora lawful abortion is unconstitutional if it unduly interferes with
a woman's right to get an abortion.
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authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 4"
In distinguishing the Connecticut statute from those in which the Court had
found invalid, the Maher Court found that the regulation did not place an
obstacle in the path of pregnant women seeking abortions. The Court reasoned:
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues
as before to be dependent on private sources for the services she desires.
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby
influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on
access to abortion that was not already there."
The Court concluded that although the economic status of a poor woman
makes it difficult, or impossible in some cases, to get an abortion, the state is
not responsible for the woman's indigency and it therefore does not infringe
on the fundamental right to choose. The Court then used a rational basis test
to determine whether state funding of childbirth over abortion was related to
a constitutionally permissible purpose, pointing to the state's strong interest in
protecting the potential life of the fetus. It held that subsidizing the costs
incident to childbirth is a rational means for the state to encourage childbirth
and concluded that "[w]e certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an
indigent women who desires an abortion, but the 'Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.'"' 9
The Court's rationale, however, is unreasonable in several ways. First, by
funding childbirth over abortion, the state clearly intrudes on the right of poor
women to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy since few can afford
private abortions. Further, by making childbirth a more attractive alternative,
the state regulation forces poor women into making decisions they may not
have made if government funds were available for abortions as well as
childbirth. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion clearly illustrates these points:

47. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. After the ruling in Maher, the Court in Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519. 521
(1977) held that the city of St. Louis did not commit a "constitutional violation ... in electing, as a policy
choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services
for nontherapeutic abortions."
48. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
49. Maher, 432 U.S. at 479, quoting, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
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[A] distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished pregnant women
is inherent in the Court's analysis .... [Many indigent women will feel
they have no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the
State will pay for the associated medical services, even though they would
have chosen to have abortions if the State had also provided funds for that
procedure, or indeed if the State had provided funds for neither procedure.
This disparity in funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent
pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise choose to
poor,
have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only operate upon the
0
pressure.1
financial
of
form
this
of
victims
the
who are uniquely
Three years after Maher, the Court in Harrisv. McRae5 , extended the right
of a state not to fund with government money nontherapeutic abortions to
include those that are medically necessary if the federal statute does not
reimburse the state for such procedures.
In Harris, respondents had challenged the statutory and constitutional
validity of the Hyde Amendment,"2 which prohibits the use of federal funds
to reimburse cost of some abortions under the Medicaid program. Respondents
charged that although the Hyde Amendment allows withholding of federal
reimbursement for some medically necessary abortions, a participating state still
has to provide such abortions under its Medicaid program.
The Court concluded, however, that a state does not have to fund such
abortions, emphasizing that participation in the Medicaid program requires a
joint contribution by both the federal government and the participating state.
It further recognized that Congress did not enact Title XIX to assume unilateral
funding of any health service in an approved Medicaid program and that the
program is "not a device for the Federal Government to compel a State to
provide services that Congress itself is unwilling to fund. " "

50. Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
52. Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program except under cerain circtmstances. The funding restriction, commonly
known as the Hyde Amendment, has been modified a number of times since it was enacted. The 1980
amendment reads:
'N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carded to term; or except for such medical
procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly
to a law enforcement agency or public health service." Pub. L 96-123. s 109. 93 Stat. 926 (1980).
53. Harris, 448 U.S. at 309.
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In examining whether the Hyde Amendment violates the liberty protected
under the Due Process Clause, the Court recognized the Court's holding in Roe.
It emphasized, however, that Roe did not adjudicate a right to an abortion
funded by the government but only the right to choose without undue
interference. It held:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due
Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent
woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize
other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause
supports such an extraordinary result.-"
In distinguishing the two cases, the Harris Court concluded that Roe
involved instances in which the government's interest in potential life would
justify state interference with women's choices to have an abortion. On the
other hand, the HarrisCourt held that the government did not seek to interfere
with or impose restraints on any woman's choice to have an abortion. Rather,
it held:
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy
the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather
of her indigence. Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically
necessary services generally, but not certain medical necessary abortions,
the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with
at least the same range of choices in deciding whether to obtain a
medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all."
The Court's analysis, however, falls short for various reasons. First, the
Hyde Amendment-through its financial incentives-takes away a poor woman's
freedom to choose abortion over childbirth. As a result, by implementing such
incentives "the Hyde Amendment deprives the indigent woman of her freedom

54. ld. at 318.
55. Id. at 317.
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to choose abortion over maternity, thereby impinging on the due process liberty
right recognized in Roe v. Wade." 6
Further, the HarrisCourt's view that the firancial constraints that restrict a
poor woman's ability to enjoy the full range of her constitutional rights are the
result of her indigency and not that of the government is unrealistic. The Court
fails to acknowledge that it is not just the woman's poverty that affects her
right to choose but rather her poverty coupled with the government's failure to
subsidize abortion as it does childbirth.
While the Court concludes that the Hyde Amendment does not places
obstacles in the path of a woman choosing to terminate a pregnancy, the
legislation actually takes away the choice for poor women.
Finally, the Hyde Amendment runs contrary to the purpose of Medicaid in
offering medical services to those who otherwise cannot afford them. For
example, Under Title XIX, the participating states are reimbursed for almost
all medically necessary services included in its general categories except for
abortion unless continuing the pregnancy endangers the mother's life. In
response, Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch
to impose the political majority's judgment of the morally acceptable and
socially desirable preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the
Constitution entrusts to the individual. Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment
does not foist that majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon
everyone in our Nation, rich and poor alike; rather, it imposes that
viewpoint only upon that segment of our society which, because of its
position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend
its privacy
57
rights from the encroachments of state-mandated morality.
After Harris,the Court in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive
Health,58 struck down provisions in a state law that unduly interfered with a
woman's right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. In Akron, the Court
invalidated a city ordinance that (1) required all abortions after the first
trimester to be performed in a hospital; (2) prohibited a doctor from performing
an abortion on a minor 15 years old or less with parental consent or court

56. Harris, 448 U.S. 297, 333 (1980) (Brennan. J., dissenting).
57. Id at 332.
58. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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order, (3) required doctors to make specific statements to patients before
performing an abortion to ensure informed consent, which included advice on
complications as well as agencies to provide information on adoption,
childbirth, and abortion techniques; (4) prohibited doctors from performing an
abortion until 24 hours after the woman signs a consent form; and (5) required
doctors performing such procedures to dispose of the remains in a safe and
sanitary manner.
In finding the regulation unconstitutional, the Court first reaffirmed the basic
principle that a woman has a fundamental right to choose whether to terminate
a pregnancy as established in Roe and its progeny. 9 While the Court
emphasized that a woman's fundamental right is not unqualified, it held that
restrictive regulation by the state must be supported by a compelling interest,
which does not become compelling until the end of the first trimester. 6° The
Court held that "until that time, a pregnant woman must be permitted, in
consultation with her physician, to decide to have6 an abortion and to effectuate
that decision 'free of interference by the State.' 1
The Akron Court found that the state restriction was not supported by a
compelling interest. For example, a state requiring the woman's informed
consent before an abortion may have a valid interest in protecting the pregnant
woman's health. A state, however, does not have "an unreviewable authority
to decide what information a doctor must give a woman before she chooses to
have an abortion.' 2
While the Court recognized instances in which a state may regulate abortion
in the first trimester, pointing to Danforth, in which it upheld two Missouri
provisions that applied to the first trimester, 63 the Akron Court held that the
decisive factor was the State showed that these regulations furthered important
health-related concerns without interfering with a woman's choice between
abortion and childbirth.
The Akron Court's holding was consistent with principles established in Roe
involving a woman's right to privacy in making such a choice. Yet, in a
dissenting opinion, led by Justice O'Connor, the dissenters expressed their

59. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
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dissatisfaction with the Roe trimester framework in determining viability. The
dissent contended that the majority's analysis of the regulation in Akron, is
inconsistent with that used in previous cases, pointing to Maher and Harrisin
which the Court applied an "unduly burdensome" standard to determine
whether the regulation interfered with a woman's right to choose. The dissent
argued that the majority should have applied the same standard throughout the
pregnancy without referring to the various stages. It held:
If the particular regulation does not "unduly burden" the fundamental
right, . . . then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our
determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose. Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in
this difficult area, "the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Platonic
Guardians' nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws
because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy,
"wisdom,' or 'common sense."64
Three years after Akron, the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,s extended a state's right to refuse to subsidize with government
funds the cost of nontherapeutic abortions in public facilities and by public
employees. In addition, the Webster plurality, for the first time in 16 years,
abolished the Roe framework involving viability.
In Webster, appellees had challenged the constitutionality of four sections of
a Missouri statute that regulated abortion. The provisions (1) banned the use
of public facilities for performing or assisting in nontherapeutic abortions; (2)
prohibited use of public funds to encourage or counsel women to have
nontherapeutic abortions; (3) specified in its preamble that human life begins
at conception and that unborn children had various protected interests; and (4)
required doctors to conduct viability tests before performing abortions.
The Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which had struck down these provisions as violating the principles
established in Roe.'
In addressing the restrictions on the use of public employees and facilities
to perform nontherapeutic abortions, the Court pointed to cases in which it had

64. Akron, 462 U.S. 416,453 (1983) (O'Connor, 3., dissenting), quoting, PlyIer v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202,
242 (1982) (Burger, Ci., dissenting).
65. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
66. Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988).
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recognized a state's right to subsidize childbirth but not abortion and held that
discretionary allocation of public funds did not violate Roe.67
It further held that the appeals court had erred in holding that "ft]o prevent
access to a public facility does more than demonstrate a political choice in
favor of childbirth; it clearly narrows and in some cases forecloses the
availability of abortion to women." 6' Further, the Webster Court rejected the
lower court's reasoning that banning abortions in public facilities prevents a
woman's doctor from performing an abortion if the doctor does not have status
at other hospitals.
Rather, the Court held that Missouri's choice in using public facilities and
employees to encourage childbirth rather than abortion places no governmental
obstacle in the path of women choosing to have an abortion and reasoned:
The challenged provisions only restrict a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated with
a public hospital. This circumstance is more easily remedied, and thus
considerably less burdensome, than indigency, which "may make it
difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have
an abortion" without public funding.
Having held that the State's refusal to fund abortions does not violate Roe
v. Wade, it strains logic to reach a contrary result for the use of public
facilities and employees."
Appellees in Webster had also challenged three provisions of the Missouri
Act that prohibited use of public funds to encourage or counsel a woman to
have an nontherapeutic abortion. The lower court had held that all three
provisions were unconstitutionally vague and that "the ban on using public
funds, employees, and facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have an
abortion is an unacceptable infringement of the woman's fourteenth amendment
right to choose an abortion after receiving the medical information necessary
to exercise the right knowingly and intelligently."'
The Court, however, held that this issue was moot since the state had only
appealed the section that stated no public funds can be used for this purpose
and held that the provision was not directed at a doctor's conduct but was
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simply an instruction not to allocate public funds for abortion counseling.
In addressing language in the preamble stating that life begins at conception,
the Court first held that the appeals court, in invalidating the preamble,
misconceived dictum in Akron, which indicated that "a state may not adopt one
theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortion.""' Rather, the
Webster Court held that the preamble does no more than protect unborn
children in tort and probate law, which is permissible under Roe.'7
Finally, in addressing the viability issue, the Court first held that the
trimester framework established in Roe is not consistent with the Constitution
since none of its key elements are found in its text. "[T]he result has been a
web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code
of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine.""7 The Court
further rejected the theory in Roe involving the point of viability and held that
"[w]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting
it before viability."7 4 Rather, the Court held that the state merely has chosen
viability as the point at which its interest in potential human life must
safeguarded. While it recognized that such tests will increase the cost of
abortion as well as regulate the doctor's discretion in determining viability, it
concluded that requiring these tests furthered the state's interest in protecting
potential human life.
In upholding the provisions, the Webster Court declared that it fell short of
overruling Roe and its progeny. Yet, the view of the Webster Court concerning
viability was explicit as far back as Akron, in which the dissenters expressed
their dismay with the Roe framework regarding viability. However, the Webster
Court's narrow holding is disturbing because the plurality, in its attempt to
limit abortion, focuses on a constitutional question involving interpretation that
did not exist.
Section 188.029 of the Missouri Act states in part that before performing an
abortion, a doctor "shall perform or cause to be performed such medical
examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational
age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such
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findings" into the mother's medical record." In interpreting the section's
meaning, however, the plurality read the provision to require a doctor, before
performing an abortion on a woman believed to be carrying a fetus of 20
weeks or more, to determine whether the fetus is viable. In doing so, the Court
held that the doctor must conduct these tests to determine the fetus's gestational
age, weight, and lung maturity.
Although the Webster Court found moot the Missouri section that banned
the use of public employees to encourage a woman to have a nontherapeutic
abortion, such attempt to prohibit abortion-related speech may have set the tone
for Rust v. Sullivan.76
Petitioners in Rust-Title X grantees and doctors who supervise such
funds-challenged the validity of the 1988 regulations, alleging that they were
based on an impermissible construction of the statute prohibiting use of Title
X funds in programs where abortion is a method of family planning; violate
First Amendment free speech rights of Title X recipients, their staffs, or their
patients by impermissibly imposing view-point discriminatory conditions on
government subsidies; and violate a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose
whether to terminate a pregnancy and impermissibly infringe on the doctorpatient relationship.
In holding the statute constitutional, the Court first evaluated whether the'"
Secretary's interpretation of the statutory language, "[n]one of the funds
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion
is a method of family planning,"" is a plausible construction of the statute's
plain meaning and does not run contrary to the intent of Congress.
The Court noted that since the Act's language is ambiguous and does not
directly address abortion counseling, it must give substantial deference to the
Secretary's construction as that of the agency charged with administering the
statute. Pointing to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defenses," the
Rust Court held that the agency interpretation is not an abuse of discretion
since it reflects the statute's plain meaning and does not conflict with the intent
of Congress.
The Rust Court further held that the broad language in the statute plainly
allows the abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy regulations since it does
not define the method of family planning and does not illustrate what type of

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id at 513 (emphasis added).
111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1990).
467 U.S. 837, 842-844 (1984).

RIGHTS OF THE POOR

medical and counseling services are entitled to funding. The Court rejected
petitioner's claim that the regulations reverse the Secretary's longstanding
policy permitting nondirective counseling and abortion referral. Rather, it held
that the new regulations "are more in keeping with the original intent of the
statute, are justified by client experience under the prior policy, and are
supported by a shift in attitude against the elimination of unborn children by
79
abortion."
In addressing the petitioner's challenge involving the government placing
viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on its subsidies, the Court held that the
statute is constitutional since the government-through its allocation of
funds-may favor childbirth over abortion.' In contrasting this view to Roe,
the Rust Court pointed to its earlier holdings in which it held that although the
government may not infringe on a woman's right to choose, it does not have
to fund such activity."'
Further, while the Rust Court recognized that it has invalidated laws
regulating speech motivated by a mere desire to curtail a particular
viewpoint,' it held that in favoring childbirth over abortion, the government
has chose to fund one activity and exclude another. Chief William H.
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that "[t]he government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternate program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way. u
The Court further held that by prohibiting counseling and referrals on
abortion, the regulations merely ensure that the funds are not used for activities,
which include speech, that are outside the scope of the federal program. While
petitioners contend that if the government subsidizes one protected right it must
subsidize another, the Court rejected this argument, reasoning that i[t]o hold
that the government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible
goals, because the program in advancing these goals necessarily discourages
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alternate goals, would render numerous government programs constitutionally
suspecL "
Further, the Rust Court reasoned that the regulations do not force recipients
of Title X or its employees to give up abortion-related speech. Rather, they
merely require that such activities be kept separate from the Title X project.
Additionally, while there may be a problem with the traditional doctor-patient
relationship, which has enjoyed First Amendment protection from government
regulation, the Court felt that it need not resolve the issue since Title X
regulations do not "significantly impinge on the doctor-patient relationship. "s
Yet, there is an obvious conflict between this reasoning and what is permissible
speech between a doctor and patient. In Akron 6 , and later in Thornburgh v.
American CoIL of Obst. & Gyn," the Court explicitly upheld a woman's right,
with the guidance of her doctor, to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.
In recognizing the permissible speech between doctor and patient, the Court in
both instances struck down regulations that, in an attempt to regulate abortion,
interfered with this relationship.
In addressing petitioner's challenge involving a woman's Fifth Amendment
right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, the Court pointed to
its holding in Webster, in which it held that the government had no constitutional duty to fund. activities merely because they are afforded Constitutional'
protection. Rather, the Court emphasized its holding in Harris,in which it held
that allocating government funds to promote childbirth does not place a governmental obstacle in the path of a woman wishing to have an abortion and leaves
her with the same choices as if the government had chosen such services.8"
In addition to overlooking the reality that a poor woman's economical status,
along with a state's preferential funding of childbirth over abortion,
constructively destroys her right to make such a choice, the Court's analysis
reflects the type of viewpoint speech that is prohibited
under the
Constitution. 9 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun criticized the
majority for upholding restrictions on protected speech. The dissent cautioned,
"[w]hile suppressing speech favorable to abortion with one hand, the Secretary
compels anti-abortion speech with the other.... By refusing to fund those
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family-planning projects that advocate abortion, the Government plainly has
targeted a particular viewpoint.'
Further, in addressing how Rust decision will effect the rights of poor
women, Justice Brennan concluded:
[IThe majority's conclusion that "[t]he difficulty that a woman encounters
when a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or referral
leaves her in no different position than she would have been if the
government had not enacted Title X," is insensitive and contrary to
common human experience. Both the purpose and result of the challenged
Regulations is to deny women, the ability voluntarily to decide their
procreative destiny. For these women, the Government will have
obliterated the freedom to choose as surely as if it had banned abortions
outright. The denial of this freedom is not a consequence of poverty but
of the Government's ill-intentioned distortion of information it has chosen
to provide.9'

CONCLUSION

Roe v. Wade, gave women a constitutional right to decide whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy. While this right is not unqualified, the Roe Court held
that state interference is not warranted during the first trimester. As the
pregnancy progresses, however, the government's interest in protecting the
mother, as well as the potential life, grows. Only then, does the state interest
become compelling to regulate to some extent such activity.
Since Roe, numerous states have attempted to restrict a woman's right to
abortion through allocation of government funds. These cases illustrate that
while the government may not interfere with a woman's right to make such a
choice, it does not have to fund such activity. While much of these attempts
represent a shift in views concerning abortion rights, the most profound effect
is on those who the federally funded programs were created to help-the poor.
As a result, the government has excluded economically an entire group of
people, many of whom will have no other choice except to continue a
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pregnancy because they cannot afford a private abortion. While the Court gives
little weight to the effect of its decisions on the poor, the ultimate result is if
you are economically disadvantaged, your constitutional right to
abortion-absent use of government funds-no longer exists. Further, while a
clinic may choose whether or not to accept government funding along with its
conditions, the effect on the client may be detrimental since these women "are
given no such choice when they unsuspectingly walk into the only clinic they
can afford then receive slanted misinformation that is government-funded."9 2
In addition, the decisions in Webster and Rust not only take away the
constitutional right to abortion for poor women by funding childbirth over
abortion, they also infringe on the free speech rights of doctors and patients.
Further, while the Bush Administration has revised its regulations by allowing
doctors to give such advice, the revision is unacceptable since most women at
these facilities are advised by nurses or counselors.
Abortion referral and counseling, however, are constitutionally protected
speech under the First Amendment. 93 The Court has long held that the
government cannot infringe on constitutionally protected speech simply because
4
it believes such speech conveys dangerous ideas. In Perry v. Sindermann4
the Court specifically held:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for a number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not
rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech.
Finally, the government's use of public funds as an incentive to promote
childbirth is problematic for a number of reasons. First, such action exemplifies
many of society's views regarding the poor. For example, "[e]xpressions like
'there have always been poor people, there always will be poor people"'9 5 are
commonplace and often accepted. Yet, these views do not address the nature
of the problem. As one critic notes:
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Poverty is not a matter of scarity. We have more than enough to meet the
basic needs of everyone in our society, yet we continue to speak about
poverty as though it were a problem beyond the reach of our material
resources. Perhaps the persistence of poverty leads to the idea that it is
inherent in the structure of society. But all that has ever been required to
eliminate poverty is a redistribution of wealth."
Second, such actions by the government further contribute to a perceived
"underclass" of people often caught in a cycle of poverty. An article published
in The Economis t' that discusses the plight of poor people in America, illustrates this point as it relates to people receiving Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). It first points out "when Americans talk about an
'underclass' in their cities, they do not simply mean the poor, they mean poor
but healthy young peope who cannot or will not, but anyway do not, get a
job."98
The article further illustrates that in 1989, a single mother with two children
who worked for minimum wage (then $3.35 an hour) would only earn $33
more each month than she would get if she did not work and collected weifare.
As a result, while welfare may not be plentiful, for some poor people it is a
more attractive alternative than working for minimal wages.9 The same
analysis can be applied to the government's willingness to pay for poor women
to have children but not abortions. The government's selective use of funding
serves as an incentive to have children, especially since most poor women
cannot afford to have private abortions. In both instances, however, the result
is often the same: a continuous cycle of poverty.
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